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A B S T R A C T  28 
The pig industry is growing very fast in Argentina with an increasing need for replacement 29 
animals, feedstuff and transportation of animals. One of the main competitive advantages of 30 
the Argentinian pig industry is its being free of most major pig diseases. Within this context, 31 
applying measures aimed to reduce the risk of introduction and spread of pathogens is critical. 32 
The aim of the present study was to assess the biosecurity of Argentinian pig farms. Two types 33 
of farms were assessed: firstly, all official suppliers of high-genetic-value (n = 110) and secondly, 34 
a sample from commercial farms (n = 192). Data on the external and internal biosecurity 35 
practices applied on the farms was collected with a questionnaire. Data was analysed using a 36 
correspondence analysis and a hierarchical clustering analysis, which allowed identification of 37 
types of farms with regard to the biosecurity measures applied. Key variables characterizing the 38 
clusters were identified through an indicator value analysis. In addition, the external biosecurity 39 
of the farms was evaluated by using risk assessment tools with respect to the potential 40 
introduction of porcine epidemic diarrhoea virus. Results made evident three clusters: the first 41 
one which, amongst other measures, applied several barriers to prevent the entry of people, 42 
trucks and other vehicles, and could be considered as a group of high biosecurity, and the two 43 
other groups which applied a lower number of external and internal biosecurity measures. The 44 
results of the risk assessment showed that the routes with the highest risk of disease 45 
introduction were: replacement animals, vehicles transporting feed or animals, and visitors. The 46 
assessment of the external biosecurity showed that most Argentinian farms were not prepared 47 
for the contingency of a pathogen such as porcine epidemic diarrhoea virus. Special efforts 48 
should be made in official suppliers of high-genetic-value farms with poor biosecurity scores 49 
since they are at the top of the pig production chain and can be key for the spread of diseases. 50 
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1. Introduction 57 
Biosecurity is defined as the “… implementation of measures that reduce the risk of the 58 
introduction and spread of disease agents; it re- quires the adoption of a set of attitudes and 59 
behaviours by people to reduce risk in all activities involving domestic, captive/exotic and wild 60 
animals and their products” (FAO, 2008). At the farm level, biosecurity measures may focus 61 
either on reducing the risk of entry of new pathogens (external biosecurity) or on reducing the 62 
internal dissemination of pathogens (internal biosecurity) (FAO, 2010). 63 
Biosecurity is founded on knowledge of the epidemiology of transmissible diseases, including 64 
the duration of the contagiousness period in infected animals, the main routes of pathogen 65 
shedding, the survival of the pathogen in the environment, and the routes of infection. This 66 
knowledge allows technically appropriate measures to be designed. However, it is also 67 
important to consider the socioeconomic aspects of proposed measures, as these will have an 68 
impact on their compliance (FAO, 2010). 69 
In pig farms, a lack of biosecurity measures or the application of poorly chosen ones may lead 70 
to several disease outbreaks, including foot and mouth disease (FMD), classical swine fever 71 
(CSF), Aujeszky’s disease, and porcine epidemic diarrhoea (PED) (Elbers et al., 2001; Amass et 72 
al., 2004; Olugasa and Ijagbone, 2007; Ellis-Iversen et al., 2011; Dekker, 2014; Lowe et al., 2014; 73 
Kim et al., 2017). 74 
Argentina has a very strong tradition of livestock production, mainly for beef. However, in recent 75 
years, pig production has been growing at a rate of > 5% per year, reaching about 1 million in 76 
commercial and genetic farms in 2017, of which around 255,000 were in medium and large 77 
farms, according to official statistics (http://www.senasa.gob.ar/cadena-78 
animal/porcinos/informacion/informesyestadisticas). 79 
One of the competitive advantages of Argentinian pig production is that it is free of some of the 80 
most important pig diseases, such as the porcine reproductive and respiratory 81 
syndrome (PRRS) (Monterubbianesi et al., 2016; Carpinetti et al., 2017), CSF, FMD, and PED, 82 
which are still present in many countries of South America 83 
(http://www.oie.int/wahis_2/public/wahid.php/Countryinformation/Animalsituation). 84 
However, the sustained growth and the high intensification of the new farms create a need for 85 
more replacement animals of higher genetic value and more movement to and from farms to 86 
ship the animals and the feedstuff. Within this scenario the need to apply more biosecurity 87 
measures is evident. Based on the above, the aim of the present study was to assess the 88 
biosecurity of Argentinian pig farms by: i) de- scribing the biosecurity measures applied in pig 89 
farms supplying re- placement animals; ii) identifying typologies of farms based on the level of 90 
application of biosecurity measures; and iii) evaluating their external biosecurity with risk 91 
assessment tools. 92 
2. Material and methods 93 
2.1. Farms, data collection and validation of the questionnaires 94 
The survey was conducted in Argentinian pig farms in 2015 and 2016 included two studies. The 95 
first one, carried out during 2015, comprised all the farms officially registered by the Argentinian 96 
authorities as companies supplying breeders of high genetic value (n = 110). These farms were 97 
geographically distributed as follows: 38 (34.5%) in Buenos Aires province, 30 (27.2%) in Córdoba 98 
province, 18 (16.3%) in Santa Fe province, 5 (4.5%) in Entre Ríos province - these being the main 99 
pig-producing provinces in Argentina - and the remaining 19 farms (17.5%) in Chaco, Chubut, 100 
San Juan, Neuquén, La Pampa, La Rioja, Río Negro, and San Luis provinces. The second study, 101 
performed during 2016, focused on the evaluation of 355 commercial farms, 319 of which had 102 
100–500 sows (125 in Buenos Aires province, 93 in Córdoba province, 21 in Entre Ríos province, 103 
and 80 in Santa Fe province) and 36 had ≥500 sows (12 in Buenos Aires province, 14 in Córdoba 104 
province, 4 in Entre Ríos province, and 6 in Santa Fe province). Of both kinds of (genetic and 105 
commercial) farms, 98–98.5% operated as farrow-to-finish farms while the remaining 1.5–2% 106 
were exclusively breeding and nursery farms. In this second study, the sample size (n = 355) was 107 
calculated considering a variation in the frequency of application of biosecurity measures of 108 
50%, a confidence level of 95%, and a 5% accuracy. The study population (i.e. farms with more 109 
than 100 sows/farm) was classified by province and number of sows on the farm. The farms 110 
included in the study were randomly selected within each class based on the official registry 111 
number of each farm. 112 
The questionnaire used for collecting data on the biosecurity measures applied was the same 113 
for both the genetic and commercial farms. This questionnaire included a total of 126 questions 114 
and was divided into sections, including: a) general data of the farm such as location, number of 115 
sows, distance to neighbouring farms, etc., b) external bio- security measures related to 116 
replacement animals, vehicles, visitors and geographic risk (e.g. perimeter fence), and c) internal 117 
biosecurity measures as regards to management, installations, cleaning and personnel routines. 118 
Supplementary Table S1 shows the number of questions for the different categories included in 119 
the questionnaire. 120 
A draft questionnaire was first tested for clarity and adequacy in four farms (two with > 100 121 
sows and two with ≥500 sows) by means of a personal interview with the farmer. After making 122 
some amendments, the questionnaire (available in Spanish on request) and the guidelines for 123 
completing it, were distributed through the Argentinian National Service for Health and 124 
AgriFood Quality (SENASA) to veterinary officers, who visited the farms and supervised the 125 
collection of the data. Before the on-farm data collection, the veterinarians in charge of that 126 
task attended a workshop where they were instructed on the correct way to complete the 127 
questionnaire. 128 
Since it was the first time that this type of survey was carried out at a national level, in the first 129 
study, two thirds of the questionnaires were verified by means of a telephone call to the farmer, 130 
the veterinarians, and the laboratories. This was done to assess the quality of the in- formation 131 
collected. Data was stored in a database created with the Epi Info software (Dean et al., 2011). 132 
In the second study, using the same questionnaire, and given the results of the assessment from 133 
the first survey which showed no major discrepancies between submitted and checked data, the 134 
collected data was not verified. 135 
2.2. Assessment of farm type based on the biosecurity measures applied  136 
About 40% (50/125) of the questions were excluded from this analysis because they were 137 
determined to be redundant to the main question or had a relatively low rate of response. 138 
Variables which were included in this analysis can be found in the Supplementary Tables S2a and 139 
S2b. Since most of the questions were categorical, continuous variables (4/70) were categorized 140 
to allow a similar analysis for the entire questionnaire. The frequency of application of the 141 
different biosecurity measures were calculated and the confidence interval for the resulting 142 
proportions were estimated using the VassarStats website (http://vassarstats.net/), whose 143 
calculations are based on methods described by Newcombe Robert (1998). To explore the 144 
existence of farms with different models of external and internal biosecurity measures, a 145 
correspondence analysis and a hierarchical grouping analysis were performed. To avoid the bias 146 
derived from the fact that some farms used only external replacement stock while others used 147 
only internal replacements, data were analysed in two ways: 1) including all farms disregarding 148 
variables related to replacement animals and 2) those farms with external replacements 149 
exclusively. 150 
The Multi-Response Permutation Procedure Test (MRPP), a non- parametric method to test 151 
multivariate differences among pre-defined groups, was used to test the statistical significance 152 
of the clusters. After determining the existence of different significant clusters, an indicator 153 
value analysis was performed (Dufrene and Legendre, 1997) to determine which variables could 154 
significantly characterize each group. The observed Indicator Value (OIV) of variable I in group p 155 
is the product of two quantities: A.B, where A = np/n and B = np/Np (Np: total number of farms 156 
belonging to group p (target farms group), n: number of occurrences of the variable I among all 157 
farms, np: number of occurrences of the variable I among the target farms group p). Then A is 158 
the proportion of farms with security variable I that belong to the target group p and B is the 159 
relative frequency of the variable i among the farms belonging to the target group p (Caceres 160 
and Legendre, 2009). All the analyses were done using the PC ORD v6 software (McCune and 161 
Mefford, 2011). 162 
2.3. Evaluation of the external biosecurity by using risk assessment tools  163 
To evaluate the external biosecurity of the herds, we used the risk assessment tool developed 164 
by Allepuz et al. (2018) in a hypothetical scenario of an epidemic episode of porcine epidemic 165 
diarrhoea virus (PEDV) in Argentina. PEDV is a highly contagious enteric virus of pigs transmitted 166 
by the fecal-oral route. In farms with no previous immunity, suckling piglets suffer severe watery 167 
diarrhoea with fatality rates reaching 50–100% (Straw et al., 2006). The above-mentioned 168 
approach allowed both the estimation of a score for the annual probability of disease 169 
introduction and to decide where to concentrate the effort to reduce this risk. Briefly, the 170 
approach comprises five steps: i) identifying the possible routes of disease introduction and key 171 
parameters for each route (e.g. herd prevalence and within-herd pre- valence in affected farms); 172 
ii) calculating a score for the probability of each route harbouring the disease agent upon arrival 173 
at the farm; iii) conducting an expert opinion workshop to obtain a score for the different input 174 
parameters; iv) calculating the risk mitigation (reduction of the probability of introduction by a 175 
given route after applying a bio- security measure); and v) calculating a final score of the 176 
probability of disease introduction for each route. 177 
Based on the epidemiology of PEDV and on the Argentinian context, six routes of introduction 178 
of the disease were considered: i) replacement animals, ii) vehicles transporting replacement 179 
animals, iii) vehicles transporting animals to the slaughterhouse, iv) vehicles transporting feed, 180 
v) people visiting the farm, and vi) geographical risk (i.e. from a neighbouring farm, a 181 
slaughterhouse or a road). The risk associated with trucks transporting cadavers or manure was 182 
not considered since in Argentina each farm eliminates these materials by itself (e.g. through 183 
pits, composting, etc.). Parameters considered for the arrival of PEDV at the farm through the 184 
different routes are described in the Supplementary Table S3. An expert opinion workshop 185 
aiming to obtain the scores for the different input parameters was carried out following the OIE 186 
recommendations (OIE, 2004). The workshop was a one-day meeting with 18 veterinarians and 187 
researchers actively involved in swine practice and animal health in Argentina. The 188 
Supplementary Table S4 provides details of the selected experts, including their back- ground, 189 
years of expertise, and main area of work. Specifically, the meeting began by presenting the 190 
concept of what an expert opinion workshop is, followed by instructions on how to assign values. 191 
Experts were asked to provide ordinal values in a 0–9 scale, as proposed by Dufour et al. (2011) 192 
for expert opinion panels. This was done individually without discussion allowed at this stage. 193 
Subsequently, answers were compiled and histograms showing the distribution of the values 194 
assigned by the members were shown for group discussion. During this discussion, the members 195 
had the chance to change their values. 196 
For the input parameters representing proportions (such as the PEDV herd prevalence), a 197 
uniform probability distribution was used. This type of distribution is defined with a minimum 198 
and a maximum value, and a continuous spectrum of values occurs with the same probability 199 
within those values. Pert probability distributions were used for the input parameters 200 
representing the importance of biosecurity measures to reduce the probability of virus 201 
introduction obtained from the workshop. These distributions are defined by the minimum, the 202 
most likely, and the maximum values, which are useful to model expert opinion (OIE, 2004). 203 
The models were run using the mc2d package (Pouillot and Delignette-Muller, 2010), 204 
implemented in R (R Development Core Team, 2008). Monte Carlo simulations (10,000 205 
iterations) were performed and all non-fixed input parameters were included as uncertain 206 
parameters. The values for the prevalence of PEDV-infected herds and infected animals within 207 
infected herds were obtained from Beam et al. (2015), who studied 222 sites in the United States 208 
during the 2013 PEDV epidemic. 209 
3. Results 210 
3.1. Official suppliers of high-genetic-value farms  211 
3.1.1. Response rates and application of different biosecurity measures 212 
All the genetic suppliers answered the questionnaire. The frequencies of application of the 213 
different external and internal biosecurity measures in those farms are shown in the 214 
Supplementary Tables S2a and S2b. The question response rate was: 100% for 68/126 questions 215 
(54.0%; lower and upper limits of the 95% confidence interval = CI95%: 45.7–62.4); between 95% 216 
and 99.9% for 31/126 questions (24.6%; CI95%: 17.9–32.8); between 90% and 95% for 8/126 217 
questions (6.4%; CI95%: 3.3–12.0); and between 80 and 90% for 10/126 questions (7.9%; CI95%: 218 
4.4–14.0) of which six were related to the trucks transporting animals from quarantines. Only 219 
two questions (1.6%; CI95%: 0.4–5.6) had a response rate < 80%. 220 
It is worth mentioning that most of the genetic farms introduced gilts from external sources 221 
(77/110; CI95%: 63.6%; 54.5–72.0) and that nearly half of them (35/77, 45.5%; CI95%: 34.8–56.5) 222 
introduced them at least four times a year. Several farms introducing external gilts (36/ 77, 223 
47.0% CI95%: 35.4–58.4) transported the animals by using trucks that had been in contact on the 224 
same day with other farms or pigs of other origins. In addition to this, most of the farms that 225 
reported introducing external gilts (38/77, 49.4%; CI95%: 38.5–60.3) did not have quarantine 226 
facilities. 227 
With regard to vehicles arriving at the farm, trucks transporting feedstuff, trucks that collected 228 
pigs to be sent to the slaughterhouse, and private vehicles were allowed to enter the farm 229 
premises in 73/110 (66.4%, CI95%: 57.1–74.5), 77/110 (70.0%, CI95%:60.9–77.8), and 39/110 230 
(35.5%; CI95%: 27.1–44.7) of the farms, respectively. In addition, 63/77 (81.8%; CI95%: 71.8–88.9) 231 
farms introducing external gilts lacked specific loading/unloading docks for them. 232 
With respect to visitors, 49/110 (44.6%; CI95%: 35.6–53.9) of the farms received more than one 233 
visit per week. Also, 33/110 (30.0%; CI95%: 22.2–39.1) of the farms had a compulsory shower on 234 
entry, 69/ 110 (62.7%; CI95%: 53.4–71.2) required the use of clean clothes exclusively provided 235 
by the farm, and only 19/110 (17.3%; CI95%: 11.3–24.4) had a written biosecurity protocol for 236 
visitors. 237 
Regarding internal biosecurity, between one third and one half of the farms did not apply basic 238 
internal biosecurity measures, such as an ‘all-in/all-out’ policy (namely the moving of entire 239 
batches of animals in or out of the facilities to avoid mixing). 240 
3.1.2. Correspondence and cluster analysis 241 
In the correspondence analysis done with the 110 genetic farms (Fig. 1a and b), axes 1 and 2 242 
explained 17.9% and 6.9% of the variance, respectively. When the analysis was performed with 243 
the farms that only used external sources of gilts (n = 77), axes 1 and 2 explained 19.4% and 244 
7.7% of the variance, respectively. The hierarchical cluster analysis resulted in the identification 245 
of three significant   groups (MRPP, p < 0.0001) when considering all 110 farms and equally when 246 
analysing the farms that only purchased external replacements (Fig. 1). The indicator values are 247 
calculated to measure the strength of association of each variable with the different farms 248 
groups. For predictive purposes, the list of variables strongly associated to the farm groups has 249 
a great interest as diagnostic variables. The observed Indicator Value (OIV) associated with each 250 
cluster within the commercial and genetic farms are shown in Tables 1 and 2. Cluster 1 was 251 
associated with 26 external and 20 internal biosecurity measures. With respect to external 252 
biosecurity, the measures related to the entry of personnel on the farm were important; for 253 
example: a compulsory shower (OIV: 86.4%), a compulsory hand wash (OIV: 83.5%), and 254 
compulsory use of clean boots and clothes (OIV: 56.4%), followed by measures related to the 255 
entry of animals such as the use of a loading dock with clean and dirty areas (OIV: 43.1%) and 256 
the restriction of entry for trucks into the farm perimeter (OIV: 30.5%). The other clusters were 257 
associated only with two or three measures with lower OIV (25–40%). 258 
3.2. Commercial farms 259 
3.2.1. Response rates and application of different biosecurity measures 260 
In the case of the commercial farms, the response rate was 55.8% (198/355; CI95%: 50.6–60.9). 261 
In the subsequent analysis, six questionnaires were discarded due to a low response rate of the 262 
questions, and thus only 192 farms were analysed. Of these, 185/198 were farms with 100 to 263 
500 sows and 13/198 with > 500 sows. By provinces, 90/ 198 (45.5%; CI95%: 38.7–52.4) farms 264 
were from Buenos Aires, 52/198 (26.3%; CI95%:  20.6–32.8) from Santa Fe, 34/198 (17.2%; 265 
CI95%:12.6–23.0) from Córdoba, and 22/198 (11.1%; CI95%:  7.5–16.3) from Entre Ríos, thus 266 
resulting in a representative sample of the country. 267 
The frequencies of application of different external and internal biosecurity measures in these 268 
farms are shown in the Supplementary Tables S2a and S2b. As can be observed, 156/192 (81.3%; 269 
CI95%: 75.1–86.1) of the farms in this group purchased replacement gilts from external facilities 270 
and 49/156 (31.4%; CI95%: 24.7–39.1) of these used two or more sources. In 79/156 (50.6%; CI95%: 271 
42.9–58.4) of the farms that purchased external gilts, replacement animals were transported in 272 
vehicles that could have visited other farms on the same day, whereas in 49/156 (31.4%; CI95%: 273 
24.7–39.1) of the cases, gilts from different origins could have been transported on the same 274 
truck. In 93/156 (59.6%; CI95%: 51.8–67.0) of these farms, gilts arrived at the farm every 90 days 275 
or less. Only one farm had the quarantine unit outside the premises, at more than 1,000 m 276 
distance. 277 
In 141/192 commercial farms analysed (73.4%; CI95%: 66.8–79.2), trucks that transported animals 278 
to the slaughterhouse belonged to external companies, and in 42/192 (21.9%; CI95%: 16.6–28.3) 279 
they could have loaded or unloaded pigs in other farms on the same day. In addition, 111/192 280 
(57.8%; CI95%: 50.7–64.6) of the farms did not have loading docks with delimited clean and dirty 281 
areas. 282 
Concerning visitors, 82/192 (42.7%; CI95%: 35.9–49.8) of the farms had less than one visitor per 283 
week and 64/192 (33.3%; CI95%: 27.1–40.3) had a policy to restrict visitors. Clothes and boots 284 
were provided to visitors in 116/192 (60.4%; CI95%: 53.4–67.1) and 143/192 (74.5%; CI95%: 67.9–285 
80.1) of the farms, respectively. Internal biosecurity measures within this group of farms (Fig. 2a 286 
and b) were also rarely applied and, in fact, no cleaning or disinfection procedures were carried 287 
out between different animal batches in 51/192 (26.6%; CI95%: 20.8–33.2) of the farrowing 288 
rooms, in 41/192 (21.4%; CI95%:  16.2–27.7) of the nursery units, and in 77/192 (40.1%; CI95%: 289 
33.3–47.2) of the fattening facilities. 290 
3.2.2. Correspondence and cluster analysis 291 
In the correspondence analysis in relation to the whole population of commercial farms analysed 292 
(n = 192), axes 1 and 2 explained 13.5% and 6.32% of the variance. In the analysis of the farms 293 
using external sources of gilts (n = 153), axes 1 and 2 explained 11.3% and 5.9% of the variance. 294 
The hierarchical cluster analysis for the whole population and equally that for farms with 295 
external gilts showed three significant groups (MRPP, p < 0.0001) (Fig. 2). The indicator values 296 
that distinguished to a greater degree between groups of farms are shown in Tables 1 and 2. As 297 
shown in Table 1, clustering was defined by 41 variables, 38 of which were strongly associated 298 
with cluster 1. Furthermore, the dressing room with separate dirty and clean areas, the 299 
compulsory shower for visits, and the compulsory hand wash between stages of production 300 
were highly associated with that cluster (percentage of perfect indication = 64%, 52.6%, and 301 
584%, respectively). Clusters 2 and 3 were characterized by three and five variables, 302 
respectively. 303 
3.3. Risk scoring: EVALUATION of the EXTERNAL biosecurity 304 
3.3.1. Expert PANEL meeting 305 
The Supplementary Table S5 shows the scores provided by the experts for the different 306 
parameters. All members agreed on the importance that vehicles intended to transport animals 307 
to the slaughter- house must not arrive loaded with animals from other farms (scores 8–9 on 308 
the 0–9 scale). However, with respect to the importance of disinfection of the truck after visiting 309 
the slaughterhouse, disagreement was higher (range of 0–9). There was also a high variability in 310 
the perception between experts about: the importance of measures related to quarantine (such 311 
as the location of quarantine facilities, use of exclusive personnel, or the importance of 312 
examining incoming gilts); the importance of barrier measures (such as sanitary fords or loading 313 
docks); the importance of workers not having contact with other pigs; and the measures related 314 
to visitors (e.g., the requirement of using boots and clothes provided by the farm). 315 
3.3.2. Risk assessment 316 
Figs. 3 and 4 show the mean values of the initial score for the probability of introduction, the 317 
risk mitigation, and the final score for the probability of PEDV introduction by each route for 318 
both the genetic and commercial farms. The results for both groups of farms were quite similar, 319 
showing that the routes with higher initial and final scores were: i) the introduction of 320 
replacement animals, ii) the vehicles transporting feedstuff, iii) the vehicles transporting 321 
animals, and iv) the visitors. The results also revealed that the application of biosecurity 322 
measures was quite variable in both groups. The risk mitigation for the different routes ranged 323 
from 0 to 0.95, indicating that some farms did not implement any measures while others had a 324 
high level of biosecurity. In addition, the median for the proportion of risk reduction was below 325 
40% in all routes from both groups. 326 
The introduction of replacement animals was one of the routes with the lowest application of 327 
biosecurity measures. The median for the proportion of risk reduction for this route was 7.3% in 328 
the genetic farms and 12.8% in the commercial farms and for about 50% of the farms biosecurity 329 
measures to block this route were extremely low. On the other hand, the geographic risk had a 330 
low initial and final score for the probability of disease introduction, which correlates to the low 331 
pig density in the country. 332 
4. Discussion 333 
The present study intended to assess the biosecurity of pig farms of Argentina, a country 334 
experiencing a very rapid growth in the pig population. The study focused firstly on farms 335 
producing replacement animals of high genetic value. Those farms are essential to sustain the 336 
continuous increase in pig production but the introduction of a major pathogen in one of them 337 
could have a catastrophic national impact. 338 
The survey of genetic suppliers was exhaustive because it was compulsory as a part of the 339 
national pig health program. Since this was the first time that this type of survey was conducted 340 
in Argentina, the data was additionally verified by means of a telephonic interview with the 341 
veterinarians in charge of the farm or directly by visit. This additional verification of the data 342 
assured a very accurate picture of this type of farm, reducing potential measurement biases. 343 
This verification was not performed in the group of commercial farms. For this second group, 344 
some measurement bias might exist as some farmers might have not answered what they really 345 
do on their farm. On the other hand, for some questions (mostly those related to quarantines) 346 
the response rate was low. In our opinion, the lack of an answer was related to the fact that 347 
some farms actually lacked quarantine facilities and also to the lack of knowledge of the 348 
importance of some biosecurity measures. These could have introduced some classification 349 
bias in the analysis. It would be desirable to do a future follow-up in order to update results, 350 
as the implementation of measures might change over time. For commercial farms the 351 
enrolment was voluntary, which resulted in a lower participation rate of about half of the 352 
farms within the categories examined. This voluntary participation could have introduced 353 
some selection bias. 354 
Hierarchical cluster analysis revealed three types of farms in terms of the biosecurity practices, 355 
across both providers of genetic and commercial farms. These three clusters were also 356 
significant within all farms and only those purchasing external gilts. This reinforces the notion 357 
that the clusters found truly represented the types of farms present in Argentina. 358 
For both types of farms, the first cluster had in common several measures such as the existence 359 
of strict barriers preventing the entry of people, trucks and other vehicles to the farm, with clear 360 
indication of clean and dirty areas, representing in all likelihood high biosecurity operations. 361 
Most of the farms in this group were new or belonged to large companies. The second and third 362 
clusters represented farms with an intermediate and a low level of biosecurity, respectively. 363 
These results agree with those found by Bottoms et al. (2013) and Laanen et al. (2013), who 364 
observed that the larger and more modern farms implement more biosecurity measures. In our 365 
case, most of the larger farms are new and belong to large companies with a high technical 366 
standard.  367 
Although three types of farms were identified, the percentage of variance explained by the 368 
analysis was relatively low (25–27% in breeders and 17–20% in commercial farms). This suggests 369 
that the combination of biosecurity measures adopted by a given farm has a certain degree of 370 
randomness and, consequently, the clusters contain some internal heterogeneity. In our 371 
opinion, this is an indication of the complexity surrounding decision making and the 372 
implementation of biosecurity measures. Beyond the technical level or the size of the farm, the 373 
diversity probably arises from the diverse level of expertise and experience of veterinarians and 374 
producers, their personalities, and their connection with sources of technical information 375 
(Racicot et al., 2012; Alarcon et al., 2013; Simon-Grifé et al., 2013; Nantima et al., 2016). Besides 376 
this, the fact that Argentina is free of most of the main pig diseases may also influence the 377 
perception of any need to implement biosecurity programs. Indeed, previous research noticed 378 
an increase in the biosecurity standards after the introduction of a new disease in neighbouring 379 
countries such as Uruguay and Chile (Nöremark et al., 2009). 380 
In the present study, the evaluation of external biosecurity with regard to the introduction of 381 
PEDV showed that most Argentinian farms are not prepared for such eventuality. PEDV is an 382 
extremely transmissible agent with a very low minimum infective dose (Thomas et al., 2015). If 383 
introduced in Argentina it would be very difficult to prevent    its entry in the farms as has 384 
happened recently in different countries of America. 385 
There are some tools that may be used to compare the biosecurity status between pig farms or 386 
for farm-specific counseling (Pinto and Urcelay, 2003; Laanen et al., 2013; Postma et al., 2016; 387 
Holtkamp et al., 2013b). All these tools are based on values obtained through expert opinion 388 
panels. In the present study, we used a methodology based on the risk assessment tool recently 389 
developed by our group (Allepuz et al., 2018), also using expert opinion panels. Since the opinion 390 
of experts may vary depending on the features of a given disease, the epidemiological 391 
circumstances of a country, or the prevailing ideas at a given moment, scoring systems based on 392 
perceptions must be adapted to each situation. Here, we conducted an expert opinion workshop 393 
with Argentinian veterinarians to adapt the values to the context and situation of the country. 394 
The 18-person panel was composed of veterinarians working in the pig sector whose expertise 395 
included the most common profiles (health, husbandry, etc.). Because of this diversity, some 396 
persons could be more sensitive to risks than others. 397 
In our analysis, the routes identified with the greatest risk for the entry of PEDV into farms were 398 
the transport vehicles of replacement animals and feed, the visitors, and the replacement of 399 
animals. Our results are consistent with those of other studies where the vehicles and their 400 
drivers, the clothing and boots, the workers and materials for the farm were identified as ways 401 
of transmitting PEDV (Kim et al., 2017; Lowe et al., 2014; Dee et al., 2015; Scott et al., 2016). It 402 
is worth mentioning that Argentina is a very large country and movements of animals between 403 
farms or slaughterhouses can involve distances of up to one thousand kilometres. For this 404 
reason, the costs of transportation are high and the distribution of young sows to medium and 405 
small farms or the transportation of animals to the slaughterhouse is usually carried out by a 406 
truck serves several farms on the same day, with the consequent risks. 407 
The lack of significant differences in the external biosecurity scores when comparing farms that 408 
sell high-genetic-value animals and commercial farms is in some way surprising. However, this 409 
could be due to the heterogeneous composition of the group of genetic farms. In Argentina, high 410 
genetic value is sold by large modern farms with high biosecurity standards, but also by some 411 
small farms (on average about 50 sows) with a low level of compliance with biosecurity 412 
measures. Two facts stand out in relation to the application of biosecurity measures: the 413 
diversity of measures applied and the lack of basic measures, such as an isolated quarantine in 414 
many of them. The first fact suggests a lack of consensus on the minimum biosecurity standard 415 
of this type of Argentinian farm. We believe that this consensus is necessary to establish 416 
appropriate biosafety guidelines. In this regard, international actions leading to the 417 
development of such consensus guidelines would be of great help for the pig industry in 418 
Argentina and elsewhere. The second fact, or the lack of some basic measures, is more local and 419 
implies a serious risk because of the central role of genetic farms as providers of replacement 420 
animals and therefore a potential disseminator of diseases in this country. 421 
In summary, the present study shows a nationwide application of a biosecurity assessment 422 
methodology that allowed the characterization of pig farms and their typological classification. 423 
This methodology allowed detecting biosecurity gaps and identifying farms with poor bio- 424 
security that could be critical to the whole pig production system. The results of the present 425 
study may help veterinarians, producers, and health authorities to establish plans to improve 426 
biosecurity against enteric pathogens such as PEDV. The results may also be useful for the design 427 
of education programs on biosecurity. The combination of this methodology with others, such 428 
as the analysis of movement networks, can greatly improve the biosecurity of pig farms at a 429 
regional scale. In the present case, the introduction of PEDV was used as a scenario, but the 430 
results could be easily extrapolated to other pathogens and countries. 431 
5. Conclusion 432 
The application of biosecurity measures in Argentinian pig farms was diverse and some of the 433 
biosecurity gaps identified in this study represent a high risk for the pig sector. Special efforts to 434 
improve should be made by the suppliers of breeder animals with poor biosecurity standards, 435 
since they are at the top of the production chain. Based on this study and the identification of 436 
the routes with higher risk of introduction of enteric pathogens such as PEDV to Argentinian 437 
farms, veterinarians and farmers should pay special attention to the biosecurity measures 438 
related to the movement of replacement animals, the transport of feedstuff, and visits. The 439 
results of this study could be useful to improve the application of biosecurity measures, and thus 440 
reduce the risk of disease dissemination. Moreover, it provides information on the points that 441 
should be addressed in the training of professionals and farmers in the country. 442 
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Table 1  
Indicator Variables (% of perfect indication) for each biosecurity cluster not related to the replacement of animals in genetic and commercial farms.       
     Biosecurity Measures                                                                                                                                            Genetic Farms                                   Commercial farms  
                 ID cluster   OIV  (%)     p (value)*     ID cluster    OIV (%)     p (value)* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
References: ID Cluster = identification of the group to which each biosecurity measure constitutes an indicator value; OIV (%) = observed indicator values for each 
biosecurity measure; p (value). 
   * = Monte Carlo test of significance of the observed maximum indicator value based on 1000 randomizations for the hypothesis of no differences between groups. 
 
 
 
Semen produced in the farm 
Presence of sanitary ford 
3 
1 
35.1 
46.7 
0.0326 
0.0002 
 
1 
 
37.9 
 
0.0002 
Presence of disinfection arch 
Presence of loading dock for each production phase
1 
1 
43.2 
28.8 
0.0002 1 17.5 0.0002 
Truck for market animals: 
It belongs to the farm/company 
It does not go to other farms on the same day 
It does not arrive with animals 
 
3 
 
33.7 
 
0.0228 
 
1 
1 
1 
 
20.2 
45.4 
40.3 
 
0.0076 
0.0002 
0.0002 
It is disinfected between every loading/unloading of animals 
It is disinfected after taking the animals to the slaughterhouse 
It does not enter the perimeter of the farm 
1 
 
1 
38.5 
 
36.9 
0.0034 
 
0.0006 
1 
1 
1 
46.2 
42.4 
32.6 
0.0002 
0.0002 
0.0002 
The dock has an enclosed clean / dirty area 
Restrictions to the truck driver regarding the access to the farm 
Treatment of carcasses by well 
1 
1 
3 
45.3 
46.0 
39.5 
0.0002 
 
0.0020 
1 44.0 0.0002 
Treatment of carcasses by incineration 
Treatment of carcasses by composting 
2 
1 
25.6 
18.2 
0.0206 3 17.2 0.0074 
Number of visitors (less than 1 per week)    1 34.5 0.0008 
There is a policy restricting entry of persons 
There is a record of visits 
There is an office 
There is a sign with instructions at the entry 
1 
1 
1 
1 
54.5 
54.7 
52.5 
36.7 
0.0002 
0.0002 
0.0002 
1 
1 
1 
43.4 
46.2 
36.4 
0.0002 
0.0002 
0.0006 
Visitors must use boots provided by the farm (required) 1 53.8 0.0002 1 42.3 0.0002 
Visitors must use clothes provided by the farm (required) 1 67.4 0.0002 1 44.0 0.0002 
There is a dressing room 
Showers are present 
1 
1 
70.3 
79.4 
0.0002 
0.0002 
1 
1 
48.3 
48.0 
0.0002 
0.0002 
Visitors should take a shower upon arrival at the farm 1 86.4 0.0002 1 52.6 0.0002 
The dressing room have dirty and clean areas are separate 
Visitors must wash their hands before entering 
The material used belongs to the farm 
1 
1 
1 
89.6 
83.5 
36.0 
0.0002 
0.0002 
1 
1 
64.0 
51.2 
0.0002 
0.0002 
It is verified that the tools have been disinfected and not used on another farm 1 48.5 0.0002 1 41.8 0.0002 
Tools and supplies of off-farm workers are washed and disinfected before being introduced in the farm 
Farm workers must take a shower on entering the farm 
1 
1 
40.4 
88.0 
0.0006 
0.0002 
1 
1 
53.9 
46.4 
0.0002 
0.0002 
Farm workers must change their clothes and boots upon arrival at the farm 1 56.6 0.0002 1 40.3 0.0002 
Farm workers must wash their hands before moving between stages of production 
The farm workers must change their boots in and out of each stage of production 
There is a routine in the internal circulation of the farm workers 
There is a perimeter fence 
1 
1 
1 
1 
54.8 
54.6 
45.5 
46.5 
0.0002 
0.0002 
0.0002 
0.0002 
1 
1 
1 
1 
58.4 
46.1 
41.5 
34.0 
0.0002 
0.0002 
0.0002 
0.0120 
A systematic rodent control program is implemented 1 37.3 0.0034 1 35.1 0.0370 
There are nets or meshes in the windows to prevent the entry of birds 
A systematic disinfestation program is followed 
The farm operates organized into groups to inseminate sows 
There is a policy of adoption or movement of piglets 
All in-All out in maternity 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
65.3 
39.2 
53.8 
53.9 
56.5 
0.0002 
0.0006 
 
0.0002 
0.0002 
1 
1 
 
2 
2 
30.4 
33.4 
 
36.3 
38.2 
0.0258 
0.0022 
 
0.0072 
0.0004 
Animals from different weaning batches are not mixed 
Animals from different weaning batches of weaning are mixed 
All in-All out in weaning 
1 
 
1 
36.6 
 
47.8 
0.0060 
 
0.0002 
3 
2 
2 
31.3 
37.2 
35.5 
0.0002 
0.0008 
0.0098 
Uses Circovirus vaccine 
Uses Mycoplasma vaccine 
1 
2 
40.9 
34.8 
0.0004 2 36.2 0.0040 
Animals from different fattening batches are not mixed 
Animals from different fattening batches are mixed 
All in-All out in fattening units 
The farm treat effluents 
1 
 
1 
1 
36.6 
 
39.1 
51.8 
0.0022 
 
0.0006 
2 31.2 0.0120 
The effluent tank is located outside the perimeter of the farm 1 46.5 0.0002    
Drinking water for animals is potabilized 1 36.1 0.0016    
The farm uses hot pressurized water for cleaning 
The farm uses cold pressurized water for cleaning 
Brushed for cleaning 
Allow to dry before disinfecting 
1 
1 
1 
1 
12.9 
41.3 
25.4 
39.5 
0.0084 
 
0.0314 
1 
 
1 
9.8 
 
22.8 
0.0080 
 
0.0002 
 
   
 
References: ID Cluster = identification of the group to which each biosecurity measure constitutes an indicator value; OIV (%) = observed indicator values for each 
biosecurity measure; p (value). 
   * = Monte Carlo test of significance of the observed maximum indicator value based on 1000 randomizations for the hypothesis of no differences between groups. 
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Table 2 
Indicator Variables (% of perfect indication) for each biosecurity clusters related to the replacement of animals, in both ge netic and commercial farms. 
Biosecurity measures Indicator Values (%) Genetic Farms with external replacement - 2015 
ID Cluster OIV (%) p (value)
*
 
Location of replacement animals (Outside. > 1000 meters) 1 17.2 0.0354 
Duration of the quarantine period (> 6 weeks) 1 24.3 0.0034 
Replacement animals are analysed 1 25.8 0.0022 
The truck transporting replacement animals does not enter the perimeter of the farm 1 30.5 0.015 
The loading  dock  has clealy indicated clean/dirty areas 1 43.1 0.0002 
Restrictions to the truck driver regarding the access to the farm 1 49 0.0002 
Frequency of introduction of genetic animals (≥ 13 weeks) 3 39.9 0.001 
The truck for transport of aniamls from official suppliers of high-genetic value belongs to the farm or 
company 
3 54.4 0.0002 
The truck transporting replacement animals does not go to other farms on the same day 3 48 0.0006 
The truck transporting replacement animals does not arrive with animals 3 33.4 0.0448 
Biosecurity measures Indicator Values (%) Commercial farms with external replacement -2016 
ID Cluster OIV (%) p (value)* 
Duration of the quarantine period (> 6 weeks) 1 30.6 0.005 
The truck transporting replacement animals is disinfected after each loading / unloading of 
animals 
1 28.3 0.016 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
